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The 70th anniversary of the adoption of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights presents an opportunity for critical 
reflections from the Global South on why the dream of 
universalising the rights contained in this ground-breaking 
document is still just a dream. Shaped by a rigorous 
interrogation of African experiences as narrated by practitioners 
and scholars, this paper revisits some of the leading contentious 
issues which, undoubtedly, have impacted on the realisation of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on the African 
continent. The paper revisits the issue of meaning, and how 
uncertainties surrounding it have triggered controversial 
perceptions and constructions of the notion of human rights, 
aggravated by adjectival calibrations. Capturing the views of 
scholars and practitioners, this paper takes an evidence-based 
approach to the matter as it identifies and discusses some of the 
common, recurrent challenges that have compromised the 
aspiration of universalising the ideals articulated in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. These include, amongst other 
things, the impact of slavery and the slave trade, colonialism and 
neo-colonialism, the nature and impact of western hypocrisy, 
double-standards, bias and inconsistency – factors that not only 
dilute the recognition of human rights but further deepen the 
mistrust and misgivings Africans have about human rights. 
Lastly, the paper appraises the adverse impact of corruption on 
the realisation of human rights on the African continent. It is 
argued that all these factors, cumulatively, adversely impact on 
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1 Introduction 
In 2018 the global community celebrated the 70th anniversary of the 
adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (hereafter the 
UDHR). At the time of its adoption portions of Africa were still under the 
yoke of the brutal colonialism which, to some extent, has shaped socio-
economic and political developments on the African continent today.1 The 
UDHR was received with mixed feelings in Africa. Its purpose and contents 
were thought to be questionable. Given the history of the slave trade and 
later of colonialism, the whole human rights movement would face 
enormous challenges to its acceptance and implementation. The continent 
had undoubtedly known injustices, past, present and continuing. Such 
injustices are experienced on many fronts: political, racial, religious, tribal, 
and socio-economic. Undeniably, these injustices shape the perception and 
reception of human rights as well as their implementation in the challenging 
contexts of Africa. Prior to discussing some of these, perhaps it is necessary 
to consider some of the contentious ideological issues which have 
dominated contemporary human rights discourse, penned mostly by African 
scholars, in which they not only articulate their views but also capture the 
very fundamental uniqueness of African society which, in their opinion, 
cannot be ignored in the context of human rights. One of these issues is the 
question of the meaning of human rights. 
2 The question of meaning and categorisation 
Even though the UDHR initiated the international human rights movement, 
Africa would unfortunately not feature as a major player in that development. 
The reason is obvious: much of Africa was still under the tutelage of 
colonials in 1948. In spite of this, the Preamble to the UN Charter would 
"reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the 
human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large 
and small …".2 For the African "people", the end to colonisation required 
fierce urgency even though the UDHR stipulated that the rights therein were 
available to everyone, with no distinction to be  
                                            
* Avitus A Agbor. LLB (Hons) (Buea) LLM (Notre Dame, USA) PhD (Wits) Research 
Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, North-West University, South Africa. Email: 
Avitus.Agbor@nwu.ac.za. ORCiD: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9647-4849. 
1  Ocheni and Nwankwo 2012 Cross-Cultural Communication 51-53.  
2  Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations (1945) (the UN Charter). 
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… made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the 
country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, 
trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.3 
The sequel to the UDHR was the right to self-determination, which was 
given international recognition in the International Covenants on Civil and 
Political Rights (hereafter ICCPR) and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(hereafter ICESCR).4 The 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples' 
Rights (hereafter the Banjul Charter) reiterated the burning and immediate 
need to liberate colonised peoples as a collective African effort.5 
Regardless, the adoption of these international human rights instruments at 
the UN were colossal breakthroughs in the progressive recognition of 
human rights. Yet over decades scholars have not been able to agree on 
an answer to a fundamental question which resides at the centre of the 
human rights discourse and movement: what actually is the meaning of 
human rights and how does meaning situate in the context of a world in 
which the heterogeneity of cultures is an undeniable feature?6 Academics 
and practitioners alike have been engaged in debates on this question. But 
the intellectual outpourings penned by the different philosophers are not 
directed at discrediting the human rights movement. They perceive a grasp 
of the meaning as being central to the conversation (if one may use such a 
word). In the absence of such an understanding, it becomes a tedious and 
pointless task to establish the content of the instruments. If meaning is to 
be determined, it is because it defines content, especially in the case of 
human rights. In the context of human rights, understanding the meaning of 
the term may help in understanding its origin (with specificity), its evolution 
and, importantly, the contributions made by the different civilisations. As one 
searches of the meaning of human rights, one element features recurrently: 
the presence or centrality of human beings. For example, human rights are 
defined as the entitlements that a human being has by virtue of being a 
human being. If we hold this definition to be true, then some important 
questions need to be asked (not probably answered - at least, not now). 
Who grants these entitlements? Against whom are these entitlements 
                                            
3  See A 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) (the UDHR). 
4  See A 1(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(1966) (the ICESCR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(1966) (the ICCPR) respectively. 
5  Preamble to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (1981) (the Banjul 
Charter) paras 4 and 9.  
6  This evokes a host of issues, some of which touch on philosophy and the notion of 
"cultural relativism". On these topics, there is quite an impressive literature penned by 
scholars: Donnelly 1984 Hum Rts Q 400-402; Sen 2004 Philos Public Aff 315-318; 
Donnelly 2007 Hum Rts Q 281-283, 293-296. 
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granted? Do these entitlements warrant a classification or categorisation? 
Taking the last question further, intellectual discourse on human rights has 
developed numerous calibrations which in themselves do not really help in 
providing answers to these questions. For example, drawing from the two 
Covenants and the evolution beyond them, there are civil, political, social, 
economic and cultural rights. They were further classified as "first 
generation" and "second generation" rights. Then came the "third 
generation" rights.7 Drawn from these same classes of rights are qualifiers 
such as "fundamental rights";8 "moral rights";9 "natural rights",10 etc. In 
another instance, human rights have been categorised as "important": 
Shestack interrogates this classification by posing a simple (but simplistic) 
question: 
… [W]hen one–says a right is 'important' enough to be a human right, one 
may be speaking of one or more of the following qualities … intrinsic value … 
instrumental value … value to a scheme of rights … importance in not being 
outweighed by other considerations … importance as structural support for 
the system of the good life.11 
Shestack's views certainly provide a rare philosophical insight into the 
issues but they provide no answers to the recurrent questions on the 
meaning and classification of human rights. If human rights are defined as 
the entitlements that everyone has by virtue of being a human being, then 
that highlights an individualistic approach. An individual (a human being) 
possesses rights (entitlements). This at least pits such an individual against 
the community (that must recognise, respect, protect and protect these 
entitlements) in which he or she lives. Living in and within that community 
also requires that the individual must accept that other individuals possess 
entitlements which she or he must recognise and respect. It might be easy 
to accept these premises, but the recurring question is on the content. What 
is the content of these entitlements that an individual possesses? In other 
words, when rights are defined as legal entitlements that an individual 
possesses, what constitutes the substance or content of such entitlements? 
When one attempts to find an answer to this question in the context of Africa 
(and African civilisation as developed by different African societies over 
time), one may quickly perceive and interpret Africa's uniqueness as 
weirdness. But an understanding of African societies (their value systems, 
institutions, practices and philosophies) from a holistic African point of view 
                                            
7  See, for example, Saito 1996 U Miami Inter-Am L Rev 389; Algan 2004 Ankara L Rev 
124-128. 
8  Brest 1981 Yale LJ 1064.  
9  Raz 1984 OJLS 123-129.  
10  Donnelly 1982 Hum Rts Q 392-395. 
11  Shestack 1998 Hum Rts Q 203. 
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reveals a civilisation that was built on its own pillars and ideas, making it 
distinct from non-African societies. An insider’s perspective of Africa is 
context-specific as it illuminates the then-and-now fluidity of the notion of 
human rights lived in closely bonded African communities. This places the 
African apart, at least in perception, from his Western counterpart. In the 
Western world the individual is seen as an entity that lives in a community, 
regulated by law and function as an individual. Homo Africanus (the African 
man as opposed to his non-African counterpart) is the sum of his cultures 
(practices, institutions, values and norms) and his bonding (social 
interactions that are guided by his cultures). When attempting to define the 
meaning of human rights, one is tempted to delve into the question posed 
earlier: what constitutes these entitlements or human rights? What is at their 
core? To the African man it is a complex question, given the kind of 
civilisation in which he has been nurtured and to which he has been 
exposed. Consequently, Homo Africanus' understanding and application of 
what entitlements he may have are guided by the context in which he or she 
operates and how it may affect others. Put simply, to the African, "rights" 
are not defined from an individualistic perspective but by what duty he or 
she owes to the greater community at large. Like most other parts of the 
globe, Africa comprises peoples with diverse cultures, religious 
backgrounds and beliefs, races, tribes, ethnicities, economic statuses and 
political affiliations. These experiences define to a great extent the 
perceptions individuals have of their communities, their relationships with 
one another, and more importantly, what constitutes human rights in such 
contexts. 
The contentions on the meaning and content of human rights in the context 
of African civilisations as they existed and continue to exist are informed by 
the particularities of the African people as they have been shaped by the 
sum of the norms and practices that influence their perception, reception 
and practice of human rights. Africa's uniqueness, in terms of its 
civilisations, must not be misrepresented as weirdness or abominations, for 
to do that will mean African lifestyles are screened from an outsider 
perspective, with an utter lack of understanding of the unique traits of 
African societies. Ultimately, this leads to competing cultures, with one 
depicting the other as inferior and second-class, while affirming or imposing 
its superior status. 
Without an iota of doubt, the human rights movement has given rise to a 
clash of civilisations. Scholars from different backgrounds have contested 
the origin of human rights, some arguing that the Western world takes credit 
for their evolution. On the other hand, African scholars have challenged this 
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view. The origin of human rights, as argued below, remains a contested 
issue which, obviously, is linked to the question of meaning itself. 
3 The question of origin: some unfortunate misgivings 
As pointed out in the foregoing discussion, the question of the meaning of 
human rights is yet to be answered, especially as different epochs of human 
history and civilisation should have contributed to its understanding. 
Consensus thereon is far from being achieved. As controversies loom over 
the meaning, they stretch to the origin as well. If we are unable to define 
what the notion of human rights is, how then can we determine at what point 
in human existence human rights originated? 
In this regard, part of the African bias in the reception of the UDHR has been 
shaped by the perception that it is a product of Western civilisation. Its origin 
is tied to the West. Even if we ignored its origin, it has been perceived and 
argued by many scholars, some of African descent, that the substantive 
content of human rights reflects a Western civilisation and is therefore a 
"misfit" for African civilisation or societies.12 Many scholars have contested 
the universality of human rights, given the fact that each society obviously 
presents unique features which may be supportive or challenging to the goal 
of universality human rights.13 Africa is one such society. Mende debunks 
this view, arguing that those who make such claims reject human rights in 
order to justify, excuse or accommodate human rights abuses by claiming 
that they are of an alien culture: a culture that is markedly different from 
theirs. Secondly, the claim presupposes that everything about human rights 
is western, thereby ignoring the priceless contributions of the non-western 
world. Thirdly, the argument is used to validate inherent inequalities across 
the globe, ranging from slavery and colonialism to the power dynamics in 
different societies and the terrible race relations across the world.14 
Like the content and classification of human rights, the origin is quite 
important. Is it possible to pinpoint exactly when human beings began to 
have entitlements? Secondly, at what point did human rights get infused 
into social discourse? It might be challenging to answer these questions as 
controversies surround the contents and classification of human rights. If 
                                            
12  Motala 1988 Hastings Int'l & Comp L Rev 373, 378-383; Suri 2008 Cold War History; 
Cerna 1994 Hum Rts Q 740, 744-751; Mayer 1993 Mich J Int'l L 309-320.  
13  Motala 1988 Hastings Int'l & Comp L Rev 373, 378-383; Cerna 1994 Hum Rts Q 740, 
744-751; Mayer 1993 Mich J Int'l L 309-320. 
14  Mende 2019 J Int Political Theory 1-3. 
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human rights are defined as entitlements that human beings have, is it 
logical to argue that early man had rights when he first appeared in Africa? 
If the foregoing question is answered in the affirmative, then there is a need 
to revisit the argument that human rights came to Africa from the West. 
However, the emancipatory history of human rights has included many 
significant developments, which comprise both legal texts and human 
struggles. Unfortunately, legal scholars challenging human rights as a 
western concept have been limited in their notion of the development of 
human rights, and have also as confused human rights as a general concept 
with international human rights as fostered by the UN in the aftermath of the 
Second World War. Prior to the recognition of international human rights 
(which has, undoubtedly been a source of controversies), major 
developments had taken place within nations, as evidenced by the 
enactment of texts that gave legal recognition to and protection to human 
rights in those nations. For example, the English Magna Carta of 1215;15 
the English Habeas Corpus Act of 1679;16 the English Bill of Rights of 
1689;17 the US Declaration of Independence of 1776;18 the French 
Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen of 1789;19 and the United 
States Bill of Rights (1789).20 These legislative pieces, unfortunately, 
defined rights by excluding some specific categories of individuals such as 
women, slaves and people in the non-Western world. In addition to these 
texts and declarations were traditions that included enlightenment; 
liberalism; Protestantism – all adding value to the evolution of human 
rights.21 
At the core of this debate is the unfortunate misprision of perceiving or 
depicting human rights as a Western concept. That is not only incorrect and 
fallacious but very misleading. In this context, it is argued that early man 
had entitlements when he appeared in Africa. His entitlements, probably, 
could have been to the natural environment in which he lived, as well as to 
everything that was in that natural environment. He probably had rights to 
his inventions as well. The evolution of society, from primitivity to civilisation, 
would undoubtedly require legal prescripts to regulate human conduct. In 
the same light, the definition of human rights might have been nuanced to 
                                            
15  English Magna Carta, 1215.  
16  English Habeas Corpus Act, 1679.  
17  English Bill of Rights, 1689. 
18  United States' Declaration of Independence, 1776. 
19  French Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen, 1789. 
20  United States' Bill of Rights, 1789. 
21  Mende 2019 J Int Political Theory 3-5. 
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capture such changes, and the resultant effect has been to define human 
rights as those things that a human being is legally entitled to because he 
or she is a human being. On the other hand, if the notion of international 
human rights is taken broadly, starting with its evolution, then one can 
logically argue that it was born of Western civilisation. Historical 
developments preceding the birth of international human rights in 1948 do 
not lend support to this argument. To corroborate this argument, the 
language of the UDHR might be useful: 
Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous 
acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a 
world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and 
freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of 
the common people … . 
The Preamble to the UDHR not only introspects on the link between a 
"disregard and contempt for human rights" and the commission of 
"barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind" but also 
in prophetic form envisages a world in which all human beings shall live 
freely. Although this is not made explicit in the Preamble, this evokes the 
authors' graphic memories of the global conflagration that had just ended. 
World War II stands out as the most recent colossal struggle and 
development that had a direct consequence on the development of human 
rights. But the War itself did not directly reflect human (speaking in general) 
or European (with particularity) civilisation. Rather, it is argued that the War 
was a manifestation not only of mankind's unbridled cruelty to mankind, but 
of every monstrosity that mankind could ever conceive, however difficult to 
imagine. Winston Churchill's speech delivered in the USA in the aftermath 
of the commencement of the Second World War may help in painting a 
partial image of the atrocities that ravaged Europe. As Churchill remarked, 
the global community was in "the presence of a crime without a name".22 
The details of the Second World War do not suggest that they are the 
products of a civilisation. They reveal aspects of barbarism in Europe which 
Churchill himself referred to as a "merciless butchery".23 The danger, it is 
argued, has been to equate, even though mistakenly, barbarism with 
civilisation. International human rights were born out of European 
barbarism, not civilisation. These European monstrosities, as argued 
herein, helped in the development and production of legal texts that granted 
recognition to international human rights, introducing and infusing notions 
such as universality in their entitlements, and interdependence and inter-
                                            
22  Churchill 1941 https://www.ibiblio.org/pha/timeline/410824awp.html. 
23  Churchill 1941 https://www.ibiblio.org/pha/timeline/410824awp.html. 
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relatedness in their contents and realisation. These barbarities have been 
common features of struggles across the globe, some of which include the 
Armenian genocide, the numerous intra-European wars, the two World 
Wars and the brutalities with which they were waged, the Holocaust, the 
massacre of the native peoples of Americas, the segregation of black 
people in America, the exclusion of women from voting, the mass atrocities 
committed during wars of colonial conquest in Africa, the actions of the 
Germans in Namibia, etc. Even in the so-called era of human rights, 
colonialism would still continue on the African continent (and in some other 
parts of the world), this being a form of apartheid supported by the same 
leading global disciples of human rights. For the African continent, slavery 
and the slave trade, followed by colonialism, constitute the worst and most 
degrading forms of human treatment, the arrogation of superiority leading 
to the assumption of a right to control independent human beings for 
economic reasons, subjugating them to the status of second-class human 
beings. With their unapologetic tone and attitude, their claim that they are 
the proprietors and progenitors of human rights is not only fallacious and 
ludicrous but also vitiates the credibility and intent of the entire movement. 
These inhumanities, the remorseless degradation and dehumanisation of 
human beings represent the greatest barbarism ever perpetrated by 
mankind against mankind. 
Ever since man appeared on African soil, Africans have fortunately built 
their own traditions. They have had their own struggles. The aftermath of 
these struggles has gone undocumented. The history of Africa has been 
one of slavery and the slave trade, ancestral worship, reliance on the natural 
environment for survival, occupation by and subjugation to colonials, and 
the battle for the liberation of their territories. Each of these struggles was 
tied to the fundamental and undeniable fact that they, as human beings, 
have their dignity and worth, with entitlements conferred upon them by the 
Creator, and that they are not to be reduced to servants to any other human 
beings. If these struggles and their accomplishments were not chronicled, 
this does not mean that their contributions must be discredited or go 
unrecognised. The UDHR and subsequent instruments that were generated 
were all aimed at recognising the entitlements human beings have: they did 
not create these entitlements. The UDHR, in its Preamble, affirms the 
undeniable link between rebellion and human rights. Years of injustice, 
inequality, inhumanities, dehumanisation, segregation and apartness, 
packaged as the right of some part of mankind to dominate other parts, gave 
rise to the international recognition of human rights as a way of preventing 
a relapse to the status quo ante. The view that international human rights 
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are a product of European civilisation is not only fallacious and misleading 
but untenable and does not accord with the plethora of incontrovertible 
evidence that exists. 
4 The toxicity of the terrain: revisiting the unforgettable 
legacy of slavery, the slave trade and colonialism and 
their impact on human rights 
A day before the adoption of the UDHR, the UN had adopted the UN 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(hereafter the Genocide Convention). Article 1 of the UDHR articulates one 
of the most fundamental premises of international human rights: "All human 
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with 
reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of 
brotherhood." Walking down memory lane, one makes some disturbing 
findings: first, the adoption of the UDHR came eighty-three years after the 
Americans had abolished slavery; a century after the French, and 141 years 
after the English. Quite distinctive is the fact that the UDHR gave rise to the 
notion of a "juridical humanity".24 Unfortunately, despite its being premised 
on the universal entitlement of all human beings, colonialists like the British, 
the French and the Belgians could not agree to the view that this was 
applicable to colonial peoples and their territories. It seems that this 
challenge confounded the perception, reception and universality of the 
UDHR, as its powerlessness was felt in its inability to reach or be claimed 
by either the colonials or the colonised peoples. Needless to say, at the time 
of the adoption of the UDHR, European nations still maintained colonies, 
especially on the African continent, most of which attained their 
independence only in the 1960s, approximately twelve years after the 
adoption of the UDHR. 
But the inhumanity of colonisation, especially as it continued after 1948, was 
hardly the focal point in European national politics. At the level of the UN, 
its realisation of the cruelty of colonialism, in which juridical human beings 
were still deprived of the worth and dignity premised in the UDHR, would 
lead to the adoption of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Countries and Peoples. Article 1 of the Declaration stipulates the 
following: 
The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation 
constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of 
                                            
24  Esmeir 2006 PMLA 1544. 
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the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and 
co-operation. 
Article 1 not only describes what colonialism constitutes (the subjection of 
peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation) but further 
characterises it as a "denial of fundamental human rights" which runs 
contrary to the Charter of the UN. This link between colonialism and human 
rights is quite apparent. However, and unfortunately, colonialism was not 
the only systematic and widespread perpetration of gross human rights 
violations against the African people. Its predecessor, slavery and the slave 
trade, had similar ramifications for human rights. Like any persistent practice 
across the globe, the slave trade had codes in place to regulate it. Every 
nation in which this practice occurred had in place defined sets of laws, rules 
and regulations which, amongst other things, defined the status of the slave, 
the responsibility owed by the slave trader or owner to the slave, and the 
conduct of the slave trade itself. 
Even though they are explicit in themselves, it is important to reflect on some 
of these laws. The French Code Noir was decreed by Louis XIV in 1685.25 
In force until the dawn of the 1789 French Revolution, the Code Noir gave 
slaves no rights. The only exception was the responsibility to feed and care 
for the sick and old, which was shouldered by their master. The Code Noir 
stipulated that26  
… the slave who has struck his master in the face or has drawn blood, or has 
similarly struck the wife of his master, his mistress, or their children, shall be 
punished with death … . 
Another clause, worrying and dehumanising, was as follows:27 
The fugitive slave who has been on the run for one month from the day his 
master reported him to the police, shall have his ears cut off and shall be 
branded with a fleur de lys on one shoulder. If he commits the same infraction 
for another month, again counting from the day he is reported, he shall have 
his hamstring cut and be branded with a fleur de lys on the other shoulder. 
The third time, he shall be put to death. 
The Code Noir also contained a troubling definition of what would constitute 
punishment:28  
The masters may also, when they believe that their slaves so deserve, chain 
them and have them beaten with rods or straps. They shall be forbidden 
                                            
25  French Code Noir, 1685. 
26  Article XXXIII of the Code Noir, 1685. 
27  Article XXXVIII of the Code Noir, 1685. 
28  Article XLII of the Code Noir, 1685. 
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however from torturing them or mutilating any limb, at the risk of having the 
slaves confiscated and having extraordinary charges brought against them. 
That would mean that beating or chaining them with rods or straps did not 
qualify as torture. And the penalty, if any slave was tortured or mutilated, 
would be confiscation and the imposition of extraordinary charges. 
A recollection of these detailed cruelties, re-ignited by a perusal of such 
texts, breeds mental anguish and emotional pain rising from the realisation 
of what a human being could do to another human being. The discussion of 
such systemic abuses and cruelties often gets side-lined or trivialised and 
the victims of these generational cruelties are often labelled as emotional 
and irrational. Without discounting the fact that human beings who are 
endowed with reason and good conscience are bound to be emotional, 
these details question in every respect the bona fides of those who stand 
as the moral paragons of the UDHR, who were once the architects and 
perpetrators of these same inhumanities.  
Over time, reflections on these barbarous crimes, combined with 
developments on the international plane, have sparked discussions on the 
issue of reparations. Earlier attempts at reparations for slavery featured the 
"forty acres and a mule" plan propounded by General William Sherman at 
the end of the Civil War., which was quickly reversed. Similarly, in the UK 
the Church of England, which also owned slaves and plantations in the 
Caribbean, seemed to have been the only institution that was willing to give 
serious thought to the idea of reparations. 
In 2001 Human Rights Watch, as a contribution to the debate on 
reparations, remarked as follows:29 
We begin with the premise that slavery, the slave trade, the most severe forms 
of racism associated with colonialism, and subsequent official racist practices 
such as Apartheid in South Africa or the Jim Crow laws in the United States 
are extraordinarily serious human rights violations. If committed today these 
would be crimes against humanity. 
The remark, unfortunately, begets critic ism. In retrospect, would these 
actions not only be tantamount to crimes against humanity and but be 
genocide as well? Or do the legal characterisations thereof hinge on issues 
of law? In other words, in the absence of a law that recognised and 
protected human rights, these "violations" would not amount to any form of 
illegality, immorality or inhumanity? As a point of departure, if human rights 
                                            
29  Human Rights Watch 2001 https://www.hrw.org/news/2001/07/19/approach-
reparations. 
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are considered to be the entitlements someone gets based on the fact that 
he or she is a human being, then such an a fortiori moral position also 
compels us to think and conclude that slaves, like their masters and traders, 
had rights. Yet they were deprived of these rights as a further extension of 
the assumed racial superiority of another race, with the use of oppressive 
and coercive measures. In the absence of any codified laws that gave, 
recognised or protected the rights of slaves, such cruelties were unnatural 
and immoral, and did not reflect the reason and good conscience endowed 
upon every human being. Put simply, the slave trade and colonialism were 
unnatural offences, immoral in content and illegal in operation.  
Unlike the other countries in the northern hemisphere that took part in the 
slave trade, France has officially accepted some responsibility for the role it 
played in the slave trade.30 At a reception honouring the Slavery 
Remembrance Committee on 10 May 2001, the then French president 
Jacques Chirac described slavery as "a wound ... a tragedy ... an 
abomination perpetrated by Europeans for several centuries, through an 
unspeakable trade between Africa, the Americas and the islands of the 
Indian Ocean".31 
Slavery and colonialism shared so much in common. First, for the most part 
the perpetrators were the same. Second, they were predominantly practised 
by the West. Third, they share a common theoretical apparatus: the 
imposition of dominance by a race that perceives itself as being superior on 
another race perceived as inferior. 
                                            
30  It is important to consider, in a comparative perspective, the manner in which Queen 
Elizabeth referred to the slave trade during her address to the joint session of the 
Virginia assembly on the occasion of the commemoration of the 400th anniversary of 
Jamestown on 3 May 2007: Queen Elizabeth II 2007 
http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/queenelizabethvageneralassembly.htm. 
See also the former US President, Bill Clinton’s seeming or near-apology on 17 June 
1997: Clinton 1997 https://edition.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1997/06/17/clinton.race/. 
On the other hand, Former British Premier, Tony Blair, was categorical and 
unequivocal when he referred to slavery as one of history's most "shameful 
enterprises" (even though he failed to apologise for it): Blair 2007 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6493507.stm. Former Mayor of London, Ken 
Livingstone, did apologise for the role played by London in the slave trade. He referred 
to it as "a monstrous crime": Livingstone 2007 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/london/6474617.stm. 
31  Marlowe 2006 https://www.irishtimes.com/news/chirac-announces-slavery-memorial-
day-1.1008754. 
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5 Western indifference, hypocrisy and double standards 
In regard to the goal of universalising international human rights, it is quite 
unfortunate, vexing and disappointing to notice the conspicuous gaps and 
disjunctures that have taken permanent residence between rhetoric and 
reality. The actions and omissions of the West are not only dubious and in 
furtherance of their national interests, but have the impact of diluting the 
legitimacy of human rights. Looking at the attitudes of the Western nations, 
one can argue that they clearly and unequivocally display a disconnection 
between the aspirations expressed in international human rights 
instruments and the reality. In realpolitik contexts, national interests have 
overridden human rights concerns. The condemnation of human rights 
abuses in the western world, irrespective of the scale, depends entirely on 
what national interest will be furthered or compromised. Undoubtedly, the 
western world has made human rights a political football on the international 
plane, making it a fluid and dynamic concept with no clear underlying 
principles in regard to their protection and promotion. The volatility of human 
rights on the African continent has been brought about by its very politicking, 
as gross violations may be completely ignored without any condemnation. 
While this view may be very critical and pessimistic, a few examples are 
probably worth mentioning, as they will support the argument. On the 
African continent, documented cases of gross violations of human rights 
serve as cogent and bullet-proof evidence of western hypocrisy, indifference 
and double standards. The perpetration of apartheid in South Africa; the 
genocide in Rwanda, and the grave humanitarian crisis in the Darfur, 
Sudan, are a few examples that come to mind. One should consider the 
case of Africa in the aftermath of the Second World War. The UN Charter, 
in its Preamble, reaffirmed its "faith in fundamental human rights, in the 
dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and 
women and of nations large and small". However, the innate ineffectiveness 
of the UDHR would be reflected in the continued colonialism, during which 
the people in the said colonies were still consigned to the repressive, 
exclusive and brutal policies prescribed and implemented by people who 
had invaded them and without consent occupied their land, and had since 
then been involved in an unconscionable theft of the resources therein. 
Looking at the experience, and appraising it from the aspirational standpoint 
of the UDHR, in all fairness, one can argue that the contextual reality 
experienced by Africans was an unbridgeable distance from the aspirations 
of the UDHR and evidenced the inherent powerlessness of the UDHR itself. 
The situation was aggravated by the conspicuous unwillingness of the same 
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colonial powers to at least grant recognition to these "subjects" as human 
beings with legal entitlements in the new international legal order. 
Beyond the adoption of the UDHR, numerous international human rights 
instruments were developed partly for the purpose of furthering the 
recognition of specific categories of rights (such as social, economic and 
cultural rights, and civil and political rights), the prohibition of specific acts 
such as discrimination, the criminalisation of torture, and contextual 
definitions of the rights of vulnerable persons. Unfortunately, despite the 
rhetoric that accompanied these developments, their crystallisation into 
human rights instruments was not accompanied by the purest of intentions 
and obligations from some western countries. Take for example the actions, 
omissions and attitudes of the United States which, in all fairness, is the 
leading proponent in the international human rights movement and the 
foremost denouncer of human rights abuses. Even though the UDHR was 
spearheaded by Eleanor Roosevelt, the then First Lady of the US, the US 
played a very instrumental role in seeing to it that the UDHR did not succeed 
in becoming a binding covenant. Subsequent human rights instruments 
endured a vexing and dubious delay on the part of the US in ratifying them. 
The 1965 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination was ratified only 29 years later (in 1994), and the ICCPR in 
1992.32 The history of the ratifications discloses a disturbing trend: they 
came with a very high price, with reservations, understandings and 
declarations attached to the operation of these instruments in the US legal 
system. The ICESCR is yet to be ratified by the USA. The United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (hereafter the CRC) has not been 
ratified by only two states across the world, one of which is the USA. A 
similar pattern could be noted in regard to the United Nations Convention 
on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (hereafter 
the CEDAW), which was signed in 1980, a year after its adoption, but has 
to date not been ratified. In addition to the unwillingness to support or ratify 
the UN instrument on racial discrimination, the United States and the United 
Kingdom, obviously the two leading countries in advancing the universal 
respect for, promotion and protection of human rights, were conspicuously 
ambivalent in the 1980s on their positions regarding apartheid in South 
Africa. Specifically, the Reagan and Thatcher administrations both followed 
a policy of "constructive engagement" with the apartheid regime. They both 
vetoed the imposition of UN economic sanctions on apartheid South Africa. 
                                            
32  Upon ratification in 1992, the United States made five reservations, five 
understandings and five declarations which, in effect, severely limit the applicability of 
the ICCPR in its domestic legal system. 
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They were motivated not by the gross inhumanities perpetrated by the 
practice of apartheid, but rather by the economic considerations of free 
trade and seeing South Africa as a major bastion against Marxist forces in 
South Africa. Thatcher declared the African National Congress (ANC) a 
terrorist organisation. Her spokesman, Bernard Ingham, in the late 1980s 
expressed the opinion that anyone who believed that the ANC would ever 
form a government in South Africa was "living in cloud cuckoo land".33 
Nelson Mandela was also included in the US list of terrorists.34 
Humanitarian crises that occurred in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and 
Sierra Leone attracted unflinching commitments by the US to combat 
impunity by holding the perpetrators thereof responsible. Through 
international criminal justice mechanisms this objective was met with some 
comparable degree of success. Unfortunately, the US has shown 
unqualified opposition to the permanent International Criminal Court 
(hereafter the ICC), as opposed to its European allies. In the early months 
after the adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
US opposition reached its peak in Congress as a representative declared it 
"dead on arrival" at the US Congress.35 John Bolton, one of the most ardent 
and unrepentant critics of the ICC, called it an illegitimate court that would 
tamper with the constitutional rights of US citizens and make them yield to 
foreign and international courts.36 If the US is true to its human rights creed, 
and unequivocally believes that there should be accountability for human 
rights violations, then the US, it is thought, should be amongst the leading 
countries not only to establish such an institution but also to be part thereof. 
Given the current state of affairs, that seems very aspirational and quite 
distant from being realised. The US response to the genocide in Rwanda in 
1994 was unfathomable. With Clinton barely over fifteen months in the 
White House, as Rwanda slipped into an ethnic cleansing, Clinton instructed 
his Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to refrain from using the word 
"genocide". Rather, she would argue that Rwanda was undergoing a minor 
ethnic tension which was resolvable. Before the conflict came to an end, 
over half a million Rwandans had lost their lives. The Western powers, 
                                            
33 The Ratcatcher 2013 https://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/fight-back of-
the-thatcher-cloud-cuckoo-land-misqu. 
34  Elliott 2019 https://globalnews.ca/news/5201623/nelson-mandela-apartheid-terrorist-
south-africa/. 
35  Senator JA Helmes, Jr, Chair of the Senate Relations Committee declared the Rome 
Statute "dead on arrival" if the treaty did not grant the US veto power: see Crossette 
1998 https://www.nytimes.com/1998/03/27/world/helms-vows-to-make-war-on-un-
court.html. 
36  Tamkin 2018 https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/emilytamkin/bolton-911-icc-
israel-afghanistan-dead-to-us. 
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which predominantly occupy the United Nations Security Council, displayed 
indifference and unresponsiveness to the Rwandan mayhem. They were 
unwilling to categorise the crisis as constituting a threat to world peace and 
security. And there was a delay in recognising the need to deploy troops to 
Rwanda to bring the conflict to an end. And then, in another sub-region of 
the African continent, there was the civil war in Sierra Leone. What is 
discernible in these crises (Rwanda and Sierra Leone in Africa, and as 
compared to Kosovo in the former Yugoslavia) is that the concept of 
humanitarian intervention itself is based on the national interests of the 
western powers and not on the alleviation of human rights violations 
occurring therein. When Sierra Leone slipped into a civil crisis, Nigeria, the 
biggest African state in terms of military might and resources, committed to 
neutralising and defeating the rebellious regime that had ousted the 
democratically elected government. Nigeria undoubtedly introduced a new 
model of what was meant by humanitarian intervention for the alleviation of 
human rights abuses (both within national, regional and international human 
rights law), marked by a swift use of military force. Despite the calls to the 
western powers, no support was forthcoming from them, since they had no 
interests to protect or further therein. Complemented by a handful of 
Ghanaians, Malians and Guineans, Nigeria was able to marshal the 
ECOWAS-coordinated operations that brought to an end a murderous 
rebellious regime and reinstated the democratically elected government of 
Ahmed Tejan Kabbah. Compared to the international response to the crisis 
in the former When one compares this lack of support with the reaction to 
the Yugoslavian crisis, one is justifiably embarrassed by the glaring disparity 
in the humanitarian interventions affecting peoples in different parts of the 
world. Like many other casualties of the inexplicable violence that plagues 
African countries, the saddening images that should warrant immediate 
international condemnation and action often fade from the world's 
consciousness. In cases where humanitarian aid is considered, they are 
deficient in energy and efficacy, leaving the affected refugees scrambling 
for crumbs of mercy. 
6 The corruption factor: the complicity of the West 
A key challenge to realising the aspiration of universalising human rights 
has been the corruption factor which resides as an invisible enemy amongst 
African people. Defined as the use of public resources for private gain, 
corruption on the African continent is perpetrated by, amongst others, senior 
state officials who steal state-owned resources. These stolen resources and 
assets are transferred surreptitiously to financial institutions in Western 
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countries where they are concealed. Clearly, the theft of state resources 
affects the realisation of human rights. Borrowing from the language used 
in Article 2(1) of the ICESCR, State Parties thereto are urged to  
… take steps, individually and through international assistance and co-
operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available 
resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the 
rights recognised in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including 
particularly the adoption of legislative measures. 
Without doubt, the theft of state resources deprives such a state of the 
resources needed for the realisation of human rights. For example, to 
realise the right to healthcare, resources are needed to construct the 
requisite infrastructure and to equip such facilities with the cutting-edge 
tools needed for the investigation, diagnosis, treatment and prevention of 
ailments. Resources are also needed for the maintenance of these 
appliances as well as the acquisition of new ones. Resources are needed 
to hire, train, remunerate and retain competent personnel in sufficient 
numbers. The same applies to the right to education. In order to realise the 
right to education, resources are needed for the construction of educational 
establishments and the provision of amenities that foster the development 
of the learners' intellect, abilities, physique and morale. The recruitment of 
teachers also requires resources. When resources stolen by senior state 
officials are received by western financial institutions, socio-economic 
development is not only hijacked and derailed but further thwarts the 
possibility of realising human rights. Foreign financial institutions, especially 
those in the West, have become safe havens where stolen resources from 
African states are kept. Data from credible sources reveal that the African 
continent loses over USD 50 billion annually. Different sources reveal 
stunning figures on the amount of monies stolen and transferred out of 
Africa, putting it on a rough estimate of US$ 75 billion annually.37 Bearing in 
mind the adverse effects of these stolen resources on the realisation of 
socio-economic and political development and human rights, it is logical to 
say that the west is complicit in the theft of these resources as well as in 
diminishing the possibilities of realising human rights on the African 
continent. The resource issue, in addition to their being stolen and 
consigned to the West, also accounts for the numerous intra-state wars that 
have plagued the African continent. 
                                            
37  Hope 2020 Journal of Financial Crime 297-298.  
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7 Conclusion 
Africa is currently beleaguered by internecine, sporadic and avoidable man-
made disasters emanating from irresponsible, toxic and unresponsive 
political leadership that has abused the will of the people, deprived them of 
their welfare and altered the purpose of government. Complicit in the 
exploitation and underdevelopment of their respective communities, these 
perpetrators of divisive politics have pitted segments of their people against 
one another in a bid to further their political grip on power and, with the aid 
of other political elites, have committed the theft of state resources, 
depriving their people and states of the resources needed to pursue 
development. Often, these acts are perpetrated with the complicity of 
Western powers who would prefer to have in power leaders who further their 
(Western) interests. 
This situation is rendered more complex by the biases, hypocrisies and 
indifference of the Western world, as Western states take a remote position 
towards influencing the conduct of politics in Africa. Central to this is the 
place of human rights in terms of recognition, enforcement and 
implementation. As human rights have become side-lined by the continent’s 
political actors in pursuit of their personal and national interests, Africans 
have witnessed double-standard bearers who preach human rights but 
practice human wrongs across the continent. If Africa is the hub of serious 
crime in international law, this is largely because their perpetration on 
African soil is given very minimal attention by the same institutions that are 
supposed to prevent them. If we argue that the human race is the only race 
created by God, and everyone in the human race possesses rights 
irrespective of any differences they may have, then respect for human rights 
as well as their enforcement can be meaningful and effective only if the 
entire human race is committed to alleviating the plight of everyone else, no 
matter where he or she is. Mankind must hold this solemn and sacrosanct 
duty and obligation at the centre of its being, instead of making it a 
chameleon-like entity that changes its appearances depending on the 
context in which it is operating. 
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